

CONFIDENTIAL

24 December 1966

The Honorable John E. Cosgrove  
Assistant Director  
Office of Emergency Planning  
Washington, D. C. 20504

Dear Mr. Cosgrove:

In response to your letter of 5 December 1966 regarding the need for briefings at your regional meetings, I will be happy to provide qualified briefers, although I must request that their travel and accommodation be funded by your office.

Unfortunately, [REDACTED] has other commitments and cannot be made available at all of your meetings; he can, however, address the Seattle and Los Angeles meetings on April 18 and 20.

[REDACTED] an authority on Far Eastern affairs, has been selected for the Houston meeting on the 19th of January, and [REDACTED] a senior briefing officer, has been scheduled for your Charleston meeting. I am sure that you and your regional reservists will be pleased with both [REDACTED]

I am sure that your efforts to avoid publicity for the briefings will again be successful. The subject matter, as before, will be unclassified.

Sincerely yours,


/s/ R. J. Smith

R. J. Smith  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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STATINTL


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TO: [REDACTED]		
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REMARKS:  <i>for your information</i>		
FROM: <i>OCT/Adm</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-B  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

# The Far East





NDR  
notes

## **SOUTHEAST ASIA**

STATINTL

### **Introduction**

#### **Define Area**

**East of India.**  
**Ten States**

**South of China**  
**Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, North**  
**Vietnam, South Vietnam, Malaysia,**  
**Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines.**  
**If you wish Australia and New Zealand**  
**make it a dozen.**

#### **Interest Obvious**

**US involvement**

## **VIETNAM**

### **I. Historical**

**A. Rather than talk about the conduct and status I'm**  
**going to basics. I think this will help you read the war**  
**more effectively.**

**B. Size of S. Vietnam (Okla) Population 17 million,**  
**North Vietnam same size, 18 million. Vietnamese ancient**  
**people in SEA whose history goes back more than 2000 years.**

**C. Over 1000 years held by China. Glorious Vietnam**  
**memory of defeat of Kublai Khan in 1288.**

**D. Portuguese and French came in late 16th century.**  
**First Christian mission at Da Nang in 1615. Now known for**  
**its large American base.**

**E. Japanese occupation 1940.**

**1. Ho Chi Minh. French trained dentist became**  
**guerrilla leader 1945. Vietminh-Independence movement set**  
**up. Bao-Dai, Jap-sponsored, thrown out.**

**F. French War 1945-1954. Note difference with war today.**

**1. French suffered serious military defeats.**  
**We have not.**

**2. French intended to maintain political control.**  
**We do not.**

**3. In Paris no will to fight. We have.**

**4. France had 55,000 Frenchmen plus 120,000 Foreign**  
**Legionaries and Africans. We have 350,000 Americans committed.**

**G. Cease Fire 54 in Paris created two Vietnams.**

1. Ho in North. Bao Dai in South Japanese puppet (not rejected)
2. North committed to conquest of South from start.

**II. Before we pick up the present War a bit on ethnic problems.**

**A. The centuries of history and pre-history have left great divisiveness on population.**

**B. Vietnamese, Chinese, Indonesians, Khmer, Laos, Montenards.**

**C. Religion. Buddhists 50-60%, only 20% devout and practicing, Catholic 10%, Confucianism, Taoism, Animists, Cao Dai other local sects. Buddhists in SVN only united in 1964. Existed in SVN since 6th cent. AD.**

**D. Catholics hated as often ruling minority, Diem belonged to this hated and respected minority.**

**III. Development of Communist Drive in Vietnam**

**A. Almost as soon as Geneva Agreement signed Ho Chi Minh began effort against South.**

**B. In 55 Bao Dai removed, Diem installed.**

**C. Terrorist campaign in South begun. 90,000 moved North, 1,000 moved South. Many of the 90,000 trained and returned South as Viet Cong between 58-59.**

**D. In 59 NVN sent inspection team south to view progress of campaign. As result in '60 National Liberation Front became active. In Feb '61 Hanoi broadcast manifesto of National Liberation Front. It clearly creature of Hanoi and is today. Often differences of opinion between Hanoi and field but this normal.**

**E. In '62 Northerners (ethnic Northerners) began to move into South in numbers.**

**F. Six Communist regions in South Vietnam were created. Now nine. Below this provinces, districts, and villages. All tightly organized and run by NVN trained cadres. Many southern in origin. But the top military brass 4,3,2 star generals are largely NVN. General Nguyen Chi Thanh runs war**



(He next to Gen. Giap.) Under him NVN Generals Tran Van Tra and Tran Do. All geared into North, radio directed from north, arms and medicine supplied from north by land and sea.

### Statistics

#### A. Communist

VC 80,000  
NVN 45,000  
Paramilitary  
160,000  
285,000

#### Allied

Vietnam	320,000	
Paramilitary	395,000	
		715,000
US	350,000	350,000
Free World	50,000	50,000
of which		1,115,000
44,000 Korean		
4,000 Australian		
2,000 Philippines		

#### B. Communist Losses

	1964	1965
Killed	16,800	36,000
Captured	4,000	6,000
Deserted	1,900	8,800

1966(9 Mo) 40,000 Total  
92,000  
6,000  
14,000

Current rate of desertion nearly 50 per day. Over half are military.

Total US losses to Nov 5, '66 - 5823  
Week ending 5 Nov US 127 killed, 605 wounded. Enemy - 806 killed 199 captured.

#### C. Capabilities of Commies

1. North Vietnam 400,000 army. Could infiltrate and replace 75-100,000 annually.
2. VC can replace at same rate annually.
3. Roads thru Laos south into SV. 400 Tons daily 100 tons in rainy season. More than enough.
4. Despite losses there are more Commie troops in SVN today than at any time in past.

#### D. China Threat

##### Introduction

The fourth detonation of a nuclear device by China some three weeks ago has once again focused attention on China. Fact that Peking loudly advertised that it also had a delivery

system invited speculation and aimed at promoting fear. Peking deliverately placed it in context of Vietnam war. What is true picture about the Chinese threat to US and to SEA.

1. First Vietnam involvement

- a. Aggressive War policy and propaganda. But cautious reference involvement with US.
- b. 25,000-40,000 Chinese military (engineers and anti-aircraft divisions) in NVN. Building two airfields now.
- c. Military equipment largely smaller combat type, and anti-aircraft guns. Some vehicles and medical supplies.

2. China's Military Establishment

- a. Army in neighborhood 2½ million. Substandard of WWII type - Limited mobility and fire power Soviet design.
- b. Air Force 150,000 men. Total Aircraft 2500. Of these only 20% reasonably modern. 300-MIG 19, 30 MIG 21, 250 - IL 28 (700 mile range). Chinese are building MIG 19 possibly 20 per month. Lack all weather or night capability. No long range bombers. Lack modern ground control. Some 14 operational SAM sites.
- c. Navy 75,000. Largest ship 4 old Soviet destroyers. 30 submarines only one G class sub which might launch ballistic missile. Otherwise some motor torpedo boats and two guided missile patrol boats.

No major surface units. No modern minesweepers. No aircraft carriers.

d. Advanced weapons

Four nuclear devices set off -- 16 Oct 64 -- 24 KT, 14 May 65 -- 36 KT, 9 May 66 -- 250 KT, 26 Oct 66 -- Less than 200.

First two, U 235 - U 238. Third and probably Fourth U 235 and U 238 with Yithium 6 to produce some thermo nuclear reaction, no plutonium. Fourth shot fired about 350-400 miles by missile of unknown accuracy. If missile is comparable to Soviet NERB it could carry 2500 lb. war head.



c. Guided Missiles program for ten years. Two ranges operational since 1963. Chinese working on 300-400 miles missile (used in 4th shot) also on 1000 miles (MRBM). May be ready in 67 or 68. We have no evidence of work on ICBM. We think it must in any event be 5 yrs. off. No evidence of long range bomber.

No significant work on space vehicles known to us.

### 3. Threat to SE Asia

Short range missile is threat.

MIG's and IL 28. Bulk of Chinese air forces above SEA.

Army has 500,000 above SEA.

Above Korea 400,000 troop.

Opposite Taiwan 150,000.

Opposite India 75,000

### 4. Economy Never recovered from set back of 59-61

- a. Agriculture needs fertilizers and modern seeds.
- b. Population 750 million with 15 million increase annually.
- c. Imported 5-6 million tons food annually since 60.
- d. Cost about \$400 million annually.
- e. China now back where it was in 58.

### 5. Internal

- a. In past year in turmoil. Populace unhappy. Peasants apathetic. Professionals attacked by regime.
- b. Power struggle for months possibly since Nov 65 when Mao vanished until late March.
- c. Experts not agreed what is going on. Obvious Lin Piao now second. Liu Shao-Shi 8th or less. What next or where this ends is not indicated. Red Guard ominous development for country.

### 6. External

Chinese policy has brought frustration and failure --

(a) Ghana, (b) Algeria, (c) Indonesia, (d) Sino-Soviet Dispute.

### E. Soviet Union in Vietnam

- 1. Sino-Soviet conflict often makes difficult to get Soviet aid into NVN. Sino-Soviet conflict continues unabated.
- 2. Soviet have given SAM sites about 140.
- 3. Soviets give MIG 21 some IL 28 and heavy equipment.

4. Soviets supply 95% of POL.
5. Soviets have 1500 instructors there for SAM training. Also train NVN in USSR.
6. Soviets give public propaganda support but privately wish negotiated settlement.

F. Total Commie economic aid to NVN before 1965 about one billion dollars.

Military aid in 1965 about \$250 million, in 1966 much higher.

## G. Observations on Current Situation

### 1. Military in SVN

- a. Allied tactics of hitting concentrations "spoiling operations" resulting in heavy enemy losses.
- b. VC have lost much of their initiate aura of success lost. The number of attacks down. We choose the time and place.
- c. Example in early November in Tay Ninh area on Cambodian border in six days US forces killed and counted 853 and 9 captured. US losses 85 killed 340 wounded. Also captured regimental command post 500,000 lb. rice food, ammo, small arms and Cragmore mine factory and intelligence documents. Conflict here continuing. Major US Commitment.
- d. In DMZ Commies have heavily infiltrated. We know full NV Army division 9200 has moved in recent months. We also have killed 2000 in this area. Drive slowed here too.
- e. In recent northern action (Irving & Thayer) 16 days Commie KIA 2930, POW 1996, Allied 110 KIA.
- f. Isolated incidents of terrorism very high now. Suggests this a substitute for heavier attacks.
- g. Our KIA figure compared with known VC figure way down. We know their medical facilities primitive so heavy losses of wounded also inevitable. Many VC ill. Few adequately inoculated.
- h. Over half of population now responsive to Saigon. This considerable improvement. Harder for VC to live off land and get shelter.

### 2. Political

- a. Under Diem situation increasingly hopeless confrontation with Buddhists. Efforts in Nov 60, Feb. 61 to remove him. Finally in Nov 63 he was killed.

- b. Chaotic internal convulsions lead by Buddhists. Military dictatorship not accepted by people.
- c. Elections 11 Sept 1966 better than expected. 80% registered voters did vote, 117 seats split into four or more major groups. Much maneuvering between North and South elements Constituent Assembly now shaking down. Hopeful that real civilian government will develop. Still grave divisive problems.
- d. Buddhists now split into Conservatives and Militants. Development for the time favors the government.
- e. Refugees from VC overrun areas number about 600,000 since Jan 1966. These in camps and resettled. Major government problem.

**3. Situation in NVN**

- a. Recent report on Hanoi reveals people relatively relaxed. No serious food shortages. Morale is high. They and government still convinced they will win war. Generals, Ho Chi Minh, Van Dong rest of high command not divided.
- b. About 300,000 have been evacuated 300,000 remain and 400,000 still in suburbs of Hanoi.
- c. Bombing has destroyed 80% of chief bulk POL storage. Haiphong facilities 90% destroyed. Enough POL coming in barrels and small containers by sea. Especially by small Soviet tankers. Have enough POL. Need 16,000 tons monthly. This they are getting.
- d. Of five rail lines from China two are interdicted for thru service.
- e. Heavy road interdiction hampers severely traffic of military supplies Chinese troops help keeping rail and road service. About 20% rail bridges damaged.
- f. Major power plants severely damage one modern plant, out for at least one year supplies 20-25 percent of Hanoi-Haiphong electricity.
- g. Exports down 50%. Shipping way down grain harvests down sharply.
- h. Military establishment in NVN relatively intact.
- i. Aircraft 50 MIG 17-19, 15-MIG 21, 8-IL 28 SAM sites over 140. In July and August fired 395 got 9 aircraft 3 doves. About 3% effective.

**H. Two other areas integral part of war picture.**

**1. Cambodia**

- a. Sihanouk wishes to remain in control. Wishes to be on right side.
- b. Sihanouk has long been careful to maintain good relations with China.
- c. Sihanouk has tried to negotiate a friendly relationship with Viet Cong.
- d. Sihanouk is not a really willing collaborator of the Viet Cong. He cannot patrol his borders (600 miles with South Viet Nam) so they use him as a sanctuary, as a food market, as a route. We know what is going on.

**2. Laos**

1. As Cambodia Laos is largely a route for supplies and troops into Viet Nam.
2. We are well informed as to what moves thru. We interdict and destroy a large part of what moves.
3. Government under Prince Souvanna neutral with Western bias.
4. Laos political is marking time. Whatever happens in Vietnam will decide what happen in Laos.

**1. Outlook**

1. Commies can maintain and increase present war effort in next half dozen months even if they cannot match US commitments.
2. SVN and US and allies can maintain heavy pressure on Commies in South and slowly rebuild SVN.
3. Commies have lost initiative. Have lost much grassroot support in SVN.
4. Commies will to continue will depend largely
  - a) continuing damaging pressure by US
  - b) Commie assessment of US will to continue full war.
  - c) Evolution of political structure in SVNWill it succeed. Will villages be rehabilitated.
5. Unlikely that any likely US action, military or otherwise will persuade Commie to throw in the sponge within next several months.

**J. Thailand** A few observations on increasingly important area.

1. Thailand is in best shape of SE Asia to withstand internal and external threats.
  2. Fundamentally economic well-being. 6% annual growth.
  3. Few anti-Western biases.
  4. Ruled by military in generally effective manner.
- PM Thanon has been in power three years.  
PM Thanat. Dep PM Praphat is strongest man in govt.
5. Government has not moved toward political reform and lacks support in the countryside.

**Communist Insurgence**

1. In Northeast there is insurgency. We think no more than 1000 active hardcore.
2. These in part China and North Vietnam trained. Holding local meetings in villages. Resort to terrorism.
3. Bangkok moving ahead with counter-insurgency effort. US playing key role in promoting this effort.

**US Relations with Thailand**

1. As US is putting more forces into Thailand tensions in relations with Bangkok developing.
2. US building bases for use as required. Some 30,000 Americans now there.
3. Thanat wants mutual defense agreement. Fears that SEATO treaty and 1962 Rusk-Thanat accord not enough.

**K. Indonesia** Most populous country of SEA

1. Years ago (1 Oct 65) Commie country of SEA Gen. Suharto took over. He and several generals power in country. Malik and Sultan ultimately take orders.
2. Sukarno unlikely to come back. Still has following in Central and East Java. The National Party strong here still supports Sukarno.
3. Sukarno deprived of presidency for life. Commie party banned. Elections to be held by July 68. Political trials now in progress.



4. Economic problems major concern.
  - a) Chronic inflation. Jan to June '66 prices increased six hundred percent.
  - b) Exports are declining.
  - c) Transportation gravely deteriorated.
  - d) Indonesia's foreign debt \$2.7 billion. Has no foreign reserves.
  - e) IMF helping by setting up economic stabilization plan.
  - f) Paris meeting Dec '66 to work out details. Also \$160 million loan proposed.

5. Foreign Policy

1. Non-Alignment. Left pro-Peking.
2. Relations with USSR correct but not cordial. No debt renegotiation.
3. Malaysia confrontation ended August '66.
4. Relations with US and Western Nations greatly improved.
5. In late Sept '66 Indonesia returned to UN.

6. Prospects

1. Army will continue to hold power.
2. Slow economic improvement.
3. Suharto thinks it will take ten years.

2. China

1. China Threat

- A. Conflict of interest between US and China not likely to diminish appreciably over next decade.
- B. China leadership all in late '60s Mao 72 Liu Shao Chi Teng Hsiao-ping third in line. All militant Chou En-lai more moderate not in line. Possibly T'ao Chu head of Central-South Bureau of Party (58) and Lo Jui-Ching. Vice-minister of National Defense coming up.
- C. Chinese growth BNP 3-4% in years ahead. Agriculture not likely to grow more than 2% the rate of population growth.
- D. By 1976 China will have significant nuclear weapon capabilities. Will also have medium range missiles and subsonic bombers.
- E. This capability will still not constitute serious threat to US but can be used to blackmail Asian states.
- F. Third atomic test expected soon. First tower, second airdrop. HREM expected operational within next year.
- G. All Chinese current capability based on Soviet assistance in late 1950s.
- H. Lop Nor proving ground in northwest China. Lanchou produces fissionable material. Yumen has large reactor now under construction. Finished in 1970. Koko Nor probably also has plant for nuclear weapons.
- I. No modern delivery system LL28 too small (in year or two yrs) and a few old B29 bomber types all this is now available.
- J. We know of no Chinese ICBM work now. We thus say it would take nearly 10 years to develop.
- K. China has one missile submarine with 350 mile range.
- L. China has some SAM equipment from Russia.
- M. China has 20 surface to air sites.

- N. China has 2.3 million army. Severely limited in fire-power and mobility. Still substandard WWII force.
- O. Air Force 1900 with 270 jet light bomber. Mostly MIG 15 and 17 (US F-84 and 86). About 300 MIG-19 and 30 MIG-21.
- P. Recently China began MIG-19 (F-100) production. It has in past 18 months produced over 200 at Mukden (now Shenyang, Manchuria).
- Q. Have report that this plant is turning out about 20 aircraft per month.
- R. Navy very weak and antiquated.

## II. Economy

- A. Never recovered from set back of 1959-61. Real problem is stagnation in agriculture. *needs chemical fertilizers and fertilizer response badly.*
- B. With 15 million net increase per year, terrible problem (750,000,000). Since 1960 China has imported 5-6 million tons annually. Average cost annual \$400 million. *Ten years ago China exporting grain \$200-300 million per year*
- C. Birth control will only have significant effect many years hence.
- D. By 1965 China was back industrially where it had been in 1958.
- E. China almost self-sufficient in oil.
- F. China trade in recent years increasingly with free world (now 2/3). In '59 trade with USSR \$2 billion, in '65 about \$450 million. Japan now chief trading partner.
- G. China may have to come to grips with its economic problems at expense of its military program.

## III. China Internal

- A. Wide discontent on basis of its economic problems. Peasants sullen apathetic. Professional people bitterly attacked by regime for lack of dedicated commitment.
- B. Army morale and discipline however good, but there is a tinder box there.

#### **IV. China Foreign Policy**

**A. Reverses more than successes.**

Failure in Ghana.  
Failure in Indonesian coup attempt.  
Failure in Algeria.

**B. Above all Sino-Soviet dispute**

Raises question of validity of Sino-Soviet mutual defense treaty.

**C. Chinese policy now revolves around.**

**Vietnam**

1. Heavily committed but act circumspectly.
2. Mao says "people" do not need direct military help in such a war.
3. How much military equipment to North Vietnam.
4. Now <sup>40,000</sup> 30-47,000 Chinese troops of non-combat variety in N. Vietnam. These engineer and logistics troops to keep roads open to China.

**D. China appears not to want conflict with US at this time, but say US will attack them.**

**E. More half Chinese MIG fighters within 300 miles of southern border. View these border states as natural rice bowls for China.**

**F. Thailand next Chinese target. Openly announced.**

**G. Thais set up in Peking as leaders of fronts. There is significant outbreak of terrorism in northeastern Thailand.**

**H. In Laos Chinese Commies work thru North Vietnamese.**

1. About 10,000 North Vietnamese in Laos.
2. More N. Vietnamese coming and stiffening local Pathet Lao.

3. Chinese strong in Phong Saly area bordering on China. Building roads into area.
4. Despite all this the Geneva agreements permit Chinese Commies to keep representatives in Vietnam as advance intelligence officers.
5. PM Souvanna now ready to fight the Commies.
- I. Cambodia's Sihanouk has decided Commies will win in SEA and that he must accommodate to them.
  1. Chinese exploiting him by supplying arms and instructors.
  2. Use Cambodia as safe haven to attack S. Vietnam.

*China today lost its friend.*








# CHINESE COMMUNIST VIP'S INNER CIRCLE OF POLITBURO

(AS RANKED FROM 1958 TO START  
OF "CULTURAL REVOLUTION")



Purged

## OTHER ACTIVE POLITBURO MEMBERS



## OTHER KEY FIGURES



## KEY MILITARY FIGURES




## PARTY SECRETARIAT



## ALTERNATE MEMBERS



## GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION (STATE COUNCIL)



## VICE PREMIERS

What Is The

**EMERGENCY**  
**P**ETROLEUM  
and  
**G**AS  
**A**DMINISTRATION?

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
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New York, New York

*What is the*

# EMERGENCY PETROLEUM and GAS ADMINISTRATION.....?



Partners in Defense

Prepared by the  
National Petroleum Council  
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April 1966



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## FOREWORD

Despite our nation's commitment to world peace, we *could be attacked*.

Would we be attacked with "The Bomb"? No one can answer that question; but if we were, casualties and damage to facilities could be staggering.

In the event of a nuclear war, weapons many million times more powerful than conventional bombs would be loosed on the United States. Blast effects would be felt several miles from the point of each nuclear explosion. Fallout could be significant *hundreds of miles away*. Even with full-scale civil defense measures, between 25 and 50 million fatalities could occur in the United States if a major nuclear attack were to take place.

In spite of the prospect of such awesome damage, a majority of U.S. citizens *could survive* a nuclear attack. An important part of the petroleum industry—which now supplies three-fourths of the nation's energy—could resume effective operations following an attack if adequate precautions are taken now.

National defense is the responsibility of our government. However, it is the *cooperative job of both government and industry* to plan in advance for any degree of emergency, from a relatively limited conflict, such as the Korean conflict, to an all out nuclear war. In the latter event, the first job would be to pick up the pieces and get the industry's machinery back into running order, a task which has never had to be contemplated before in the United States.

As Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall has said on several occasions, the oil and gas industry has always taken great initiative in meeting production goals in national emergencies. "We do not anticipate war," Mr. Udall asserts, "but if an attack should come, whatever happens afterward will depend largely on the kind of preparations which have been made prior to the attack." He goes on to say that companies "must direct their imagination and energy now to preparing adequate civil defense plans and taking those actions which will insure survival from attack and restoration of company operations in a post-attack period."

Considerable analysis has been made of the actions individual companies should take in preparation for an emergency, and several major


## THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY

In carrying out its job of supplying three-fourths of the nation's energy needs, the oil and gas industry has grown to a tremendous size. It employs over 1,200,000 people. It drills over 40,000 wells a year. It produces over 9,000,000 barrels of crude oil and natural gas liquids and 43 billion cubic feet of natural gas a day. It transports crude oil, natural gas, and products through 900,000 miles of pipelines. It manufactures fuels, lubricants, and many other useful products in 300 refineries located in 40 states. It provides the raw materials for nearly 70% of all synthetic organic chemicals manufactured in the United States. Its products are distributed by 30,000 individual distributors and marketed by 200,000 service station operators. Every day, it provides the United States with over 11,000,000 barrels—nearly half a billion gallons—of fuels to power our industrial society.

studies have been completed on this subject. The elements of company emergency planning are set forth in the concluding section of this booklet, beginning on page 14.

The principal focus of this booklet, however, is on the cooperative, pre-emergency planning steps under way by government and industry to back up the efforts that individual companies make on their own.

The booklet is designed to answer such questions as: "What kind of emergency do we face?" . . . "What is likely to happen?" . . . "What plans are being made to assure supplies of oil and gas in time of an emergency?" . . . "Who will run the show and how will it be run?" . . . "What part can I and my company play in emergency preparations?"



## WHAT KIND OF EMERGENCY DO WE FACE?

The United States has to be prepared for emergencies ranging all the way from international tension through limited or general war to all out nuclear attack on this country.

In peacetime and in periods of international tension, the Office of Oil and Gas of the Department of the Interior constantly monitors develop-

ments relating to oil and gas operations. World-wide petroleum supply and demand studies under various assumed contingency situations are made regularly by the Office of Oil and Gas for the Department of Defense and or the Office of Emergency Planning with the advice and assistance of the Petroleum Security Subcommittee of the Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee. These studies provide a base for possible actions if international tension were to escalate into a major emergency.

Although the contingencies differ greatly, there is a consistent aim in emergency planning: to assure that the oil and gas industry can meet the nation's emergency requirements. Here, in brief, is what would probably be done in each of the basic contingencies:

1. In a limited war of no greater magnitude than the Korean conflict probably little change from peacetime arrangements would now be needed. Oil and gas industry capability could be assessed and coordinated by the Office of Oil and Gas. Assistance would be provided by advisory committees such as the National Petroleum Council, the Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee, and the Emergency Advisory Committee for Natural Gas. Upon request, such industry committees would provide information to the government and comment on the soundness of proposed policies.
2. In a conventional war such as World War II, the stand-by Emergency Petroleum and Gas Administration (EPGA) would be activated by the Secretary of the Interior. Much more will be said about EPGA in later sections. It is sufficient at this point to say that it would act on a coordinated national basis to develop whatever policies and directives are required to provide the petroleum supplies needed for the war effort.
3. In the event of nuclear attack, EPGA would be activated automatically and first operate on a decentralized basis from several regional offices. At a later time, with restoration of communications and rehabilitation of industry facilities, a nationally coordinated effort would be achieved as in a conventional war.

In this booklet considerable emphasis is placed on the actions to be taken during a period of nuclear conflict, because such a situation presents the challenges that are the most serious and the least familiar. However, government planning recognizes the need to be flexible in order to handle a variety of emergencies.

## WHY MAKE PLANS NOW?

Any future national emergency could be far different from the conditions of World War II or the Korean conflict. On those earlier occasions, there was considerable delay after the crisis arose in formulating emergency plans and recruiting personnel for the mobilization effort. The start-up time on earlier occasions illustrates the importance of advance readiness. The *next* time—should there be a next time—we may not have any time to plan and organize *after the fact*. Our “lead time” is *now*.


Clearly, we must be prepared with well thought-out plans to survive the shock of initial attack, to adapt to the many new problems that will arise, to fight back against an aggressor successfully, and to reconstitute the American economy. Without such plans, helplessness and inertia—even defeat—are much more likely to occur and, in any event, rehabilitation would be uncertain and slow.

## WHAT BASIC PLANS HAVE BEEN MADE?

The planning process is well under way.

As early as January, 1949, a study on emergency planning was carried out at the request of the Secretary of the Interior by a committee of the National Petroleum Council. Following the outbreak of the Korean War, the Petroleum Administration for Defense was organized in October, 1950, along the lines recommended by the NPC committee in 1949. During and after the 1950's, the NPC made studies relating to: an oil and gas emergency defense organization; disaster planning for the oil and gas industries; security principles for the petroleum and gas industries. In 1959 and 1964, in response to further requests from the Secretary of the Interior, the NPC published reports on national emergency oil and gas mobilization.

The Office of Emergency Planning published in 1964 a revised and updated “National Plan for Emergency Preparedness,” a complete statement on non-military defense planning for the country. It provides broad guidelines for actions by government from national to local community levels, by industry and private organizations, and by individual citizens throughout America. It outlines what must be done in specific areas for survival and restoration of the economy upon a nuclear attack. Some examples of the essential subjects covered are: Civil Defense; Health; Manpower; Food; Water; Economic Stabilization; and Housing.



One of the Plan's 16 chapters—Chapter 10, entitled “Fuel and Energy”—deals with oil and gas, solid fuels, and electric power. General guidance is provided on the assumed effects of attacks, the organization and responsibilities for meeting military and essential civilian requirements for oil and gas, actions to be taken in limited emergencies, and actions to be taken in a general war.


## HOW WOULD THE NATIONAL PLAN WORK?

The National Plan brings together and summarizes in a single document the basic plans and guidance issued by the government agencies in carrying out their legislative and executive mandates. The broad and far-reaching powers for actions prescribed in the National Plan are derived from the authority vested in or to be provided to the chief executives of Federal, state, and local governments by their respective constitutions, statutes, local charters and ordinances and, specifically, by defense emergency legislation at all levels of government.


For example, the Department of Labor has been assigned planning responsibility for the best use of manpower in an emergency. The Department of Commerce is responsible for industrial production and ocean shipping. Protection of the civilian population is entrusted to the Office of Civil Defense. The Department of Agriculture is responsible for the supply and distribution of food. The resources which the Department of the Interior is responsible for mobilizing are oil and gas, electric power, solid fuels, and minerals.

The activities of the many agencies involved are coordinated in a responsible, comprehensive program by the Office of Emergency Planning in the Executive Office of the President. The pre-emergency relationship between the Interior Department's Office of Oil and Gas, the Office of Emergency Planning, and the Office of Civil Defense, is diagrammed in Exhibit 1 on page 18.

While these activities are going forward at the national level, state and local governments are developing their non-military defense plans and capabilities, including enactment of legislation giving emergency authority to their principal officials. In general, these state and local plans follow the broad pattern established by the National Plan. The relationships between Federal and state organizations for oil and natural gas emergency activities are set forth in the illustrations below and in Exhibit 2 on page 19.



In brief, the role of the national and regional offices of the EPGA relating to oil and gas is the coordination and direction of the industrial process that provides petroleum fuels and natural gas. EPGA will also oversee the direct distribution of oil and gas from primary inventory to the military, to other countries, to certain large industrial users, to secondary inventory points—and, in the case of natural gas, to local distribution systems. Distribution from secondary oil inventories or local gas systems to all other consumers is to be directed by state and local authorities under general policy guidelines set down by national authorities. Further details on the state organization duties are contained in Office of Emergency Planning Example State Plans (see Bibliography, Item 6).





## WOULD THE GOVERNMENT TAKE OVER INDUSTRY?

The government would *not* take over industry.

In peacetime, and to a large extent in war, Americans rightfully rely on the market place to work out the intricate matching-up of supply and demand. The business community recognizes, however, that some direction from the government is necessary in time of war. A balance has to be struck between civilian and military needs. There has to be some government coordination in securing scarce material and manpower to accomplish wartime goals.

One of the key principles of the Basic Policies section (Chapter 1) of the National Plan is that we "continue a basically free economy and private operation of industry, subject to government regulations only to the extent necessary to the public interest." The National Plan further states (Chapter 10) that "Although subject to emergency controls and regulations, the provision of fuel and energy and the construction, operation and maintenance of fuel and energy facilities would remain the responsibility of their owners or operators."


Governmental direction would continue only as long as absolutely necessary.

## WHO WOULD RUN THE SHOW?

Although government controls and regulations would be imposed on industry only to the extent required by the emergency, a nuclear attack upon the United States would clearly require a major expansion of government activity and personnel.

The President specifically assigned to the Secretary of the Interior responsibility for preparing national emergency plans and developing preparedness programs covering petroleum and gas (Executive Order 10997, February 16, 1962). The principal Federal agency to carry out such plans in the event of a national emergency is the Emergency Petroleum and Gas Administration which was established by the Secretary of the Interior on August 28, 1963. The Secretary of the Interior heads EPGA as national administrator.

EPGA will be staffed largely by personnel recruited from the industry. Many of those who would be needed are already enrolled in the National



Defense Executive Reserve. NDER was established so that able and experienced civilian executives could be selected in advance of an emergency for training to occupy full-time executive positions in the Federal Government. In the oil and gas industry, employers are requested by the Office of Oil and Gas or by EPGA Regional Administrators to make executives available for service. Once an individual is selected for appointment, he is asked to join the NDER to accept an assignment to serve in a specific position in the stand-by organization. With the wealth of ability and industry experience that these men bring into the government emergency organization, oil and gas mobilization can be effectively coordinated in order to secure the goals established by the President and other top civilian government officials.

## HOW WOULD THE SHOW BE RUN?

Experience has shown that an emergency agency can contribute very importantly to effective mobilization of resources in a wartime emergency. Certainly World War II demonstrated this. Early in the war, not all the parts of the national industrial mobilization plans meshed smoothly. There was, for example, the over-all goal of producing 75,000 planes a year.

Such a large amount of our strategic materials was committed to the manufacture of aircraft and other hardware that there was not enough steel, as well as other materials, to construct the refineries needed to supply the fuel requirements for the forthcoming planes. The Petroleum Administration for War pushed for a balanced usage of our limited manpower and materials and thus helped the petroleum companies in getting the materials needed to do their wartime job.

## STAFFING OF THE EMERGENCY PETROLEUM AND GAS ADMINISTRATION

EPGA will be staffed largely by industry people selected and appointed as members of the National Defense Executive Reserve.

The NDER goes back to 1955 when an amendment to the Defense Production Act authorized the President to establish and train an executive reserve for employment in the Government in times of emergency. It had become increasingly evident that effective use of executive civilian talent is a keystone for the successful mobilization of our resources when the nation faces a crisis. Therefore, in 1956, the President issued Executive Order 10660 (now EO 11179) establishing the National Defense Executive Reserve. The Office of Emergency Planning coordinates the Reserve program on behalf of the President.

Here are answers to some questions concerning petroleum Executive Reservists:

1. *What are the qualifications for membership in the Petroleum and Gas Unit of the National Defense Executive Reserve?*  
No arbitrary qualification standards or age limits for selection of an oil or gas Executive Reservist have been established. Of course each man must have the background and experience that are relevant to his emergency responsibilities in EPGA. A candidate may be selected on the basis of administrative or professional experience that can be related to mobilization programs for oil, natural gas, and petrochemicals.
2. *How does one become a candidate?*  
Candidates are selected and appointed by the Secretary of the Interior. Generally, candidates are recruited by the Office of Oil and Gas and EPGA Regional Administrators.
3. *Is security clearance necessary?*  
Yes. Candidates must be cleared for security by the Federal Government before designation as Reservists. All clearances take from three to four months.
4. *What are the obligations of a Reservist?*  
The Reservist and his employer must sign a statement of understanding to the effect that the Reservist will be permitted to attend peacetime training sessions and that he will be available immediately for full-time Federal employment in the event of a national emergency. His initial membership in the Executive Reserve will be for a three-year term.
5. *What would be the responsibilities of the EPGA Reservist in time of emergency?*  
The Office of Oil and Gas furnishes each of its Executive Reservists a handbook and specific instructions as to where to report and the nature of his responsibilities as an EPGA official in an emergency.
6. *Will EPGA Reservists be trained for specific mobilization assignments?*  
Reservists will be trained for a specific EPGA emergency assignment in addition to general mobilization responsibilities. A Reservist normally would be assigned to the emergency work for which he had specialized experience and knowledge, but the EPGA would not be precluded from using him where most needed.
7. *How much time is the Executive Reservist expected to devote to training activities?*  
The training program is planned so that undue demands will not

The approach used by the Petroleum Administration for War in World War II and its successor organization during the Korean War, the Petroleum Administration for Defense, was considered by businessmen to be practical and effective. For example, when it was apparent that only limited amounts of tubular goods were available in World War II, PAW *could have* set up procedures to review every well that was to be drilled, considering the subjective information of geological prospects and the

exact amount of materials requested. Instead, PAW adopted simplified formulas for equitable allocation of tubular goods consistent with the war program.

There is good reason to believe the planners in both government and industry retained much of the knowledge they learned "the hard way." Such a practical approach to problem-solving will be basic to the operation of EPGA in the future.

be imposed on the Reservist's time. Regional training conferences are held not more than twice a year, and a national training conference normally is held every three years. Although the Reservist is expected to devote a *minimum* of at least three to five days per year, he may be requested to devote up to ten days a year, including all activities.

8. *What kind of training does the EPGA Executive Reservist receive?*

- Participation in test exercises and alerts to the extent practicable;
- Attendance at periodic meetings in which mobilization programs are discussed in general;
- Personal consultation on specific mobilization problems relative to his area of competence; and
- Reading publications and other communications pertaining to EPGA plans and programs—usually specifically related to the Reservist's emergency responsibilities.

9. *Is a Reservist paid for his services?*

The Executive Reservist receives no reimbursement from government for his pre-emergency training and travel expenses. When called to duty in an emergency, the Reservist becomes a Federal employee and usually serves on a salary basis under government pay schedules then in effect. If his personal or company circumstances require him to serve without government compensation, he is allowed to do so pursuant to appropriate legal authority then existing.

10. *Can a person have dual status as an Executive Reservist and a military reservist?*

Men who have obligations under the active military reserve can-

not assume the second responsibility of an EPGA Executive Reservist.

11. *Is an Executive Reservist subject to the so-called "Conflict of Interest" statutes while he is in training?*

No, he is not. Sections 203, 205, 208, and 209 of Title 18, United States Code, are applicable only to officers and employees of the United States. A person does not become an officer or employee of the United States by reason of his membership in the Executive Reserve. His activities as an Executive Reservist are confined to training and do not include advising, consulting, or acting on any matter pending before any department or agency.

12. *Is an Executive Reservist subject to the "Conflict of Interest" statutes after he reports for duty?*

A person serving in a position in EPGA would be a Government employee and subject to the statutory provisions mentioned above. There is authority, however, to make appointments to EPGA of persons who would serve as Government employees without compensation. Section 209, prohibiting the receipt by a Government employee of compensation from any source other than the Government, does not apply to persons so appointed.

Requests to Executive Reservists to accept assignments to positions in EPGA presuppose that, if and when an emergency arises, the individuals will be able to accept appointments to those positions and serve effectively under them without contravening any statutory provision. Conversely, no Executive Reservist would be expected to accept an appointment and enter on duty if at that time it appears that such action would place him in jeopardy.



CIA-RDP

HOW WOULD

**EPGA**

WORK?

In establishing EPGA, the Secretary of the Interior indicated that the agency has two primary purposes:

1. To have an organization, in being and known to Federal and state government agencies and to the industry, which is ready and authorized to discharge promptly the defense responsibilities of the Secretary of the Interior for oil and gas in the event of a civil defense emergency or an attack upon the United States. In this type of emergency, EPGA would be activated automatically; in others, the extent of operations would be specified by the Secretary of the Interior.
2. To aid the Department in its emergency preparedness functions relating to oil and gas as assigned to the Secretary of the Interior by the President.

EPGA's primary function in an actual emergency is to assist, coordinate, and direct, where necessary, activities of the oil and gas industry, in order to assure that domestic and foreign supplies of oil and gas meet essential


military and civilian requirements of the nation and its allies. In discharging this broad function, among the activities EPGA would have to perform are the following:

1. Formulate and coordinate oil and gas supply programs.
2. Act as claimant for the oil and gas industry before other government agencies to obtain supporting resources such as manpower, materials, transportation, communications and funds needed for vital programs.
3. Coordinate and direct the allocation and distribution of oil to the secondary inventory level, and gas to local distribution systems.
4. Establish and maintain communications with the oil and gas industry and with government agencies, as necessary to perform the above functions.

While EPGA utilizes the knowledge and experience of two earlier emergency oil and gas agencies that functioned effectively (PAW and PAD), it differs from its predecessors primarily in that a large degree of decentralization of its operations is provided for in case of a nuclear attack that disrupts nation-wide communications.

Even with limited communications, decentralized authority and stand-by organizational plans would allow EPGA to aid the industry early in the recovery efforts. These efforts would focus on damage-repair problems and on obtaining materials needed for repairs. The organization of EPGA would necessarily be local or regional under these conditions and might consist of many uncoordinated offices. As communications improved and operational control was restored, administration would shift to a national basis.

The EPGA organization is flexible so that it will fit the needs of any kind of national emergency. EPGA provides a far-reaching organization, all or any part of which could be readily activated. Thus, the organization arrangements would speed mobilization regardless of the nature of a future emergency. EPGA provides a ready-made organization consisting of a national headquarters, eight regional offices (see map on next page for boundaries of EPGA regions), nine gas group offices and such state and subordinate offices as may be required. EPGA structure parallels the functional lines of the petroleum industry, with staff and line units comparable to those found in a typical large, vertically integrated organization. This is apparent from looking at the organization charts of the national and regional EPGA offices. (See Exhibits 3 and 4 on pages 20 and 21)



**Map Illustrates Boundaries for Office of Emergency Planning—Office of Civil Defense and EPGA Regions**

will be with the regional and national headquarters.

Typical activities of various EPGA divisions would include: formulation of plans to meet essential military and civilian needs; development of claimancy requirements for scarce materials and special manpower skills; control of primary inventories; and liaison with industry to facilitate the production, manufacture and distribution of oil and gas.

EPGA can be expected to have a close working relationship with various state conservation bodies such as the Texas Railroad Commission and the Louisiana Department of Conservation. In addition, local EPGA representatives will be located in such key centers as the refining complexes of Beaumont-Port Arthur, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Generally, however, the contact between oil and gas companies and EPGA

The Office of Oil and Gas (OOG, see Exhibit 5 on page 22) is responsible for Interior's peacetime emergency preparedness functions relating to oil and gas, and has the responsibility for bringing EPGA to the appropriate level of pre-emergency readiness. The staff of OOG would automatically become employees of EPGA upon its activation, joining the much larger number of employees selected from industry, including those drawn from the Executive Reserve.

By special agreement the Federal Power Commission assists the Secretary of the Interior in carrying out certain areas of his emergency responsibilities as they pertain to natural gas.



# HOW WOULD EPGA AND THE INDUSTRY RESPOND TO A NUCLEAR ATTACK?

As the first step in understanding petroleum and gas operations under nuclear war conditions, it must be recognized that in a nuclear attack the United States would face the probability of severe losses in population, plus damaging losses to communications, transport, agriculture, industry and other facilities. Generally, it is felt that recovery from a nuclear attack would be characterized by three successive phases:

- (A) Shock (survival) period
- (B) Recovery and stabilization period
- (C) All out war effort.

Emergency measures in the oil and gas industry have already been summarized in broad terms in the preceding section. This section discusses in detail the steps that probably would be taken by EPGA and industry to provide adequate supplies of oil and gas to meet essential military, civilian and industrial requirements after a nuclear attack.

## 1.—Shock (survival) period

It seems likely that damage after a nuclear attack would be so great and fall-out problems so widespread that the normal channels of supply and distribution of petroleum between various regions of the United States could be badly disrupted. In general, industry would attempt to continue operating as normally as possible. The major petroleum supply actions during this period would seem to be:

- 1st.—A technical "on-the-spot" appraisal by industry of surviving petroleum inventories and facilities immediately after the initial attack.
- 2nd.—An appraisal of essential needs to be supplied from surviving capabilities.
- 3rd.—The distribution of surviving supply by a properly constituted authority in accordance with a pre-determined order of priority.

Since supplies are likely to be short in certain regions, great effort should be made to "stretch out" existing quantities. Availability of supplies in the utter disruption of a post-nuclear situation will depend upon the local initiative of regional offices, working under the guidelines of Defense Mobilization Order 8500.1A—"Guidance on Priority Use of Resources in Immediate Post-attack Period," issued by the Office of Emergency Planning in the Executive Office of the President.

In view of the necessary tasks to be done in the initial "shock" period just after nuclear attack, the following steps are planned by industry and government:

- (1) Establish damage survey teams on stand-by basis from industry personnel in each region; train and equip these units so that they can function promptly in an emergency.
- (2) Establish working relationships between Regional EPGA Administrators and state, county and municipal emergency organizations as well as oil and gas companies in order to assure that emergency procedures and responsibilities are clearly assigned.

## B) Recovery and stabilization period

During this period enemy attack would probably continue, but with less intensity. This assumes the enemy will have expended major missile capability in the early phase of the attack, and that further action will concentrate largely on United States military targets using weapons from surface or undersea vessels, plus harassment of shipping by enemy submarines and aircraft.

Under such conditions, it would be possible to re-establish control of petroleum supply and facilities on a coordinated nationwide basis under the direction of EPGA.

Communications could be re-established and coordinated action could begin to supply and distribute petroleum from lightly damaged or undamaged facilities to various parts of the country. However, available petroleum would still have to be allocated carefully to essential consumers in accordance with a broadly applicable order of priority. Also during this period oil and gas companies and industry advisory groups would, as called upon, provide regional and national headquarters of EPGA with information to assist EPGA in its operations, including:

- (a) Assessment of damage to facilities; estimates of time, manpower and materials for restoration or new construction.
- (b) Estimates of essential oil and gas requirements for civilian survival and for industrial support to the war effort.
- (c) Estimates of supply available, both current and for as far ahead as feasible.

### Fallout Conditions from a Random Assumed Nuclear Attack



Effective liaison would have to be maintained particularly at the regional level, between EPGA and the state, county and municipal emergency regulatory authorities, and the industry as part of the coordinated activity.

The main efforts of EPGA supported as necessary by the industry at this phase would focus on the following:

- (1) Aiding surviving petroleum producing, refining, storage and transport and distribution facilities to get back to a normal operation as quickly as possible.
- (2) Establishing an operating balance between raw material supply, processing capacity, and distribution facilities.
- (3) Determining what allocation of supplies is necessary and setting up procedures to accomplish it.
- (4) Designing programs to increase the availability of petroleum in the months ahead.
- (5) Claiming manpower and materials from proper authorities to support programs.
- (6) Coordinating and guiding the operations of the petroleum industry in accordance with these programs.

To accomplish these ends, it might also be necessary to establish close working relationships with industry—regionally as well as nationally.

### C)—All out war effort

Operations and organizational effort during this period would, in general, follow the same pattern as previously outlined for the recovery and stabilization period. However, every effort would be made to expand the petroleum capabilities to meet military and industrial objectives for the successful prosecution of the war toward ultimate victory.

### INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

While the foregoing has dealt primarily with rehabilitation of the U.S. oil and gas industries, it is conceivable that certain allies of the United States (particularly those of the NATO group) would also have been subject to attack, and would be experiencing similar difficulties in supply. A great deal of what has been said in this booklet with reference to the United States would also apply to many of its Allies.

The NATO European group of countries has a relatively small volume of indigenous production and therefore relies heavily upon outside sources for supplies. In the case of a nuclear attack, it is conceivable that some (perhaps all) of these sources would be denied; in this event the United States and its Allies would have to agree on how to share the remaining resources. The problems of continuing adequate supply are, therefore, expected to become wider in scope and more complex than during the first month after the attack—in which period concentrated effort would have been directed mainly toward survival.



WHAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN


# EPGA?

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EPGA is far beyond the blueprint stage. During 1966, recruitment will continue at an accelerated pace for all key positions, both at the national and regional levels, including state managers and area liaison representatives. Key positions will number approximately 600, and it is anticipated that 90% of required personnel will have been recruited by the end of 1966.

Already, several training sessions have been held in various parts of the country for those men already recruited. A sizable volume of training materials has been distributed. Training and orientation programs are to be developed further. They will provide for: workshops, seminars and exercises, on national, regional, state and local levels; sessions to orient new Reservists; and sessions to up-date training of long-term Reservists.

Manuals for the post-activation operations of the functional divisions of EPGA are in the process of being developed. The alert and activation procedures for EPGA have been geared for direct response to a specific military alerting system. The National Industry Advisory Committee (NIAC) of the Federal Communications Commission is actively engaged in studying and preparing plans for suitable and adequate communications systems. Offices for EPGA have been tentatively assigned in the regional headquarters of the Office of Emergency Planning—Office of Civil Defense. Nine gas group office locations have been designated (see map on page 9).



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Vital information, maps and data are being compiled and pre-positioned at EPGA offices for immediate use at the outset of an emergency. An important backup data gathering and analysis system is provided EPGA by the National Resource Evaluation Center (NREC) of the Office of Emergency Planning. NREC now has input resource data covering such information as major oilfields, petroleum refineries, natural gas processing plants, alkylation and aviation gasoline facilities, tetraethyl lead plants, petroleum storage facilities, crude oil and product pipelines facilities, and gas transmission pipelines and facilities. The computer tapes on refineries, for example, contain data on each refinery as to: (1) name of company; (2) location; (3) name of nearest town; (4) crude capacity; and (5) major downstream processing capacities. Input data is utilized in high-speed computers at the NREC, which would provide helpful information in assessing damage rapidly, evaluating status of surviving resources, estimating requirements and developing production programs in the post-attack period. A similar unit is planned for each Federal Regional Center, but, in the meantime, data are fed by NREC to electronic printers at each Regional Center.

The National Petroleum Council (NPC), since its inception in 1946, has been the principal voice of the petroleum and gas industries to advise, inform and make recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior on emergency planning including the supply of data on industry operation which would be needed in an emergency. During the past decade, the NPC completed over 15 highly detailed studies directly related to such matters. In 1964, two separate reports in the field of emergency planning for the petroleum industry were published. The first is a two-volume report designed to provide oil and gas companies with a guide for the development of company emergency plans. The second NPC study is a careful analysis of the adequacy of Government plans for directing oil and gas operations in an emergency—primarily through EPGA. Continuing work in this area by the NPC includes this general information booklet and the preparation of procedural manuals for the functional divisions of EPGA. The work of the NPC is complemented by the Emergency Advisory Committee for Natural Gas. The EACNG has published an Emergency Operations Manual for the Natural Gas Transmission Industry and is currently preparing procedural manuals for the gas operating divisions of EPGA. The Office of Oil and Gas, itself, has drafted EPGA administrative and organization manuals and has issued an EPGA handbook for Executive Reservists. A selected list of NPC reports is shown in the inset at the right.

## NATIONAL PETROLEUM

### COUNCIL STUDIES

#### RELATING TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Chemical Manufacturing Facilities of the Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries (1963)  
Civil Defense and Emergency Planning for the Petroleum and Gas Industries (1964)  
Communication Facilities, Oil and Gas Emergency Defense Organization (1956)  
Defense Organization, Oil and Gas Emergency (1954)  
Emergency Fuel Convertibility (1965)  
Maintenance and Chemical Requirements for U. S. Petroleum Refineries and Natural Gasoline Plants (1961)  
Manpower Requirements, Petroleum and Gas Industries (1963)  
Materials Requirements for Oil and Gas Exploration, Drilling and Production (1963)  
Mobilization, National Emergency, Oil and Gas (1959)  
Petroleum and Gas in a National Emergency (An Analysis of Government Planning) (1964)  
Petroleum Industry Use of the Radio Spectrum (1960)  
Proved Discoveries and Productive Capacity of Crude Oil, Natural Gas and Natural Gas Liquids in the United States (1965)  
Storage Capacity, Petroleum (1963)  
Storage Facilities, Petroleum (1960)  
Transportation Facilities, Oil and Gas (1962)

EPGA has been furnished plans and manuals prepared by other agencies that will be activated immediately upon attack. These cover such vital services as: wage and salary stabilization programs; money, credit and banking; rent board instructions for stabilizing rent and determining ceiling prices of real property; ration board instructions for consumer rationing; and price board instructions for stabilizing prices and services.

## WHAT SHOULD OIL AND GAS COMPANIES DO NOW TO PREPARE FOR NATIONAL EMERGENCIES?

So far, this booklet has dealt largely with cooperative efforts of government and the oil and gas industry to prepare for operations in a time of emergency.

But there are important steps that each company can—and should—take on its own to ensure that the company can cope with a civil defense emergency.

The National Petroleum Council has prepared a report, *Civil Defense and Emergency Planning for the Petroleum and Gas Industries, containing "Principles and Procedures" and "Guide and Sample Company Plans."* The report was completed in 1964, and over 75,000 copies were printed by the Office of Civil Defense and disseminated throughout the nation to oil and gas companies as well as other industries and Government agencies. Copies are obtainable from the National Petroleum Council, 1625 K Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20006.

Among the elements of industrial civil defense planning covered in that booklet are these: (1) establishing a company civil defense program; (2) assuring continuity of management; (3) protecting employees; (4) safeguarding plant and property; and (5) providing an emergency organizational capability for restoring and continuing operations.

### 1. *Establishing a Company Civil Defense Program*

Top management in each company must inform all executive and supervisory personnel of the importance of civil defense. Top management policy direction is a vital factor in securing effective emergency planning by key management and operating personnel.

One of the first steps in getting the company civil defense and disaster control program under way is the appointment of a responsible official as civil defense coordinator. In large companies, this should be followed by the designation of key personnel as coordinators for each major operating unit, facility or plant to provide coordination and direction to the execution of the company civil defense plan and disaster plan for each separate company installation.

Company civil defense planning must be consistent with the civil defense program of the national, state and local governments. The company civil defense coordinator will want to become thoroughly familiar with the authority, organization and emergency procedures that are established by law and that will become effective upon declaration of a civil defense emergency by the President or the Congress.

### 2. *Continuity of Management*

Preservation of managerial leadership—at company headquarters and at the plant level—must be a major part of the company disaster control and civil defense plan. For each key position, replacements should be designated in order of succession. Companies should plan for continued operation of various plants and divisions as independent entities until central corporate headquarters could be re-established in the event the corporate headquarters were destroyed in an attack. Alternate corporate or plant headquarters should be established so that key personnel will have a safe place from which to operate the company business during a civil defense emergency.

### 3. *Protection of Employees*


A dependable warning system is a vital part of the civil defense planning of both government and industry. The backbone of the civil defense warning system is the National Warning System which links the OCD National Warning Center at the Headquarters of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) and more than 600 state and local warning points in the continental United States. They, in turn, relay the warning to local communities.

Complete dissemination of the warning to all office buildings, shops, plants, warehouses, laboratories and other areas where employees are located is essential. In some cases, existing public address and plant radio systems can be used. Employees must be informed about what the warning signals are, what they mean, and what action is to be taken upon receipt of a warning signal.

Identifying effective fallout shelter for employees and making arrangements for moving employees rapidly to such shelters in the event of nuclear attack are key elements of the civil defense plan for every industrial facility. The first step in planning such protection at an industrial facility is a survey of the existing structures to determine how much shelter is

An Important Element of  
Industrial Civil Defense  
Planning is

## PLANT SECURITY



available, its quality, and the number of people that can be accommodated in it.

If a building meets OCD requirements and the owner is willing to make this protected space available for public occupancy in case of a nuclear attack, the government will provide food, water, sanitary facilities, medical supplies sufficient for a two-week occupancy, and a set of radiological monitoring instruments.

The facility civil defense plan should provide for the appointment of a shelter manager for each shelter area in the facility. Similarly, other employees should be designated as necessary to assist each shelter manager in performing specific duties such as maintaining order, radiological monitoring, distributing food and water, and other required duties. Facility managers should arrange through their local Civil Defense Directors to have selected employees trained in shelter management.

Every industrial and commercial facility should have some personnel trained to detect and measure the intensity of radioactive fallout. These employees should also receive instruction in maintaining radiological monitoring equipment so that these instruments will always be ready for use. The local Civil Defense Director can arrange training in radiological monitoring for employees designated by the plant manager.

#### *Safeguarding Plant and Property*

Oil and gas installations are both critical as essential defense facilities and vulnerable to sabotage and other subversive activities. The more critical and vulnerable facilities in relation to continuity of operations should be identified and measures taken to reduce vulnerability, taking into account the possibility of power failures and natural disaster as well as enemy actions. Emergency shutdown procedures for plants should be developed and tested. Vital records should be protected including the duplication and safe storage of records important to the continuation of the company and its operations.

#### *Emergency Organizational Capability*

An early and comprehensive assessment of the damage caused by an attack is vital to quick recovery. A good disaster plan provides for organizing and training selected employees to assess damage and restore electric power, communications, gas and water services, as well as repair

of damage to production facilities. Restoration of facilities subjected to fallout involves special considerations for which appropriate preparations should be made.

\* \* \*

To be sure your company is doing all it can to prepare for survival, review the checklist prepared by the Office of Civil Defense (see page 26).

Of particular importance is integration of company preparedness measures with those being developed by the Office of Oil and Gas. To facilitate this, industry officials should get to know the Executive Reservists who are assigned as their functional counterparts in the stand-by EPGA. It would be advantageous for company managers to review their defense planning efforts with men who have been well acquainted with the emergency planning efforts of national, state and local governments (see Exhibit 6 on page 23).

Another helpful source of information for company emergency planning is the *Industrial Civil Defense Workbook*, obtainable from the Office of Civil Defense, Washington, D. C. 20025, or from your local Civil Defense Director.

## CONCLUSION

Remote as it may seem, we must face the possibility of a serious national emergency. We must prepare now for the things we would have to do so that our nation could survive and recover. How well we prepare now spells the difference between survival and defeat.

No matter what segment of the oil and gas industry a man is in, no matter how small or large his company, there is an essential part for him to play in the industry's effort to prepare for its task of supplying a major part of the nation's energy needs in an emergency.




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# PRE-EMERGENCY PLANNING & CIVIL DEFENSE RELATIONSHIPS CHART



\* In many states there is one director for both emergency planning and civil defense. In other states there are both a Director of Emergency Planning responsible for management of resources and a Director of Civil Defense responsible for civil defense matters.



# OIL & GAS

EXHIBIT 2

## FEDERAL-STATE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION RELATIONSHIP






EXHIBIT 3 NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION — EMERGENCY PETROLEUM AND GAS ADMINISTRATION



# REGIONAL ORGANIZATION — EMERGENCY PETROLEUM AND GAS ADMINISTRATION

EXHIBIT 4


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# EXHIBIT 5

## ORGANIZATION CHART OFFICE OF OIL AND GAS DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR



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David R. Oliver, Economic Research  
Ralph Williams, Reports, Publications and Information  
C. Marvin Lyles, Programming  
Ruth T. Foy, Administrative Services  
Earl G. Eiberbrake, Transportation and Storage

# U.S. Department of the Interior

## EPGA Regional Administrators

and

## Office of Oil and Gas Regional Representatives

### EMERGENCY PETROLEUM AND GAS ADMINISTRATION REGIONAL ADMINISTRATORS

Region I	H. J. Peckheiser Socony Mobil Oil Co., Inc. 150 East 42nd Street New York, New York 10017 Phone: (212) OX 7-4200
Region II	Alex S. Chamberlain Ashland Oil & Refining Company 1300 Southwestern Parkway Louisville, Kentucky 40208 Phone: (502) 772-3641
Region III	Robert P. Hamilton Dixie Pipeline Company 3376 Peachtree Road, N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30326 Phone: (404) 237-4636
Region IV	L. E. Kincannon Rock Island Refining Corp. P. O. Box 68007 Indianapolis, Indiana 46268 Phone: (317) AX 1-1200
Region V	Alvin C. Hope 1032 Milam Building San Antonio, Texas 78205 Phone: (512) CA 6-1831
Region VI	W. A. Alexander Shell Oil Company 1700 Broadway Denver, Colorado 80202 Phone: (303) 222-8454
Region VII	Darius N. Keaton, Jr. Signal Oil and Gas Company 1010 Wilshire Blvd., Room 1016 Los Angeles, California 90017 Phone: (213) 482-0722
Region VIII	Lowell E. Hunt Standard Oil Company of California 1318 Fourth Avenue Seattle, Washington 98111 Phone: (206) 623-6310

### OOG REGIONAL MOBILIZATION REPRESENTATIVES

Region I	Henry H. Willis, covering
Region II	Henry H. Willis c/o Office of Emergency Planning Olney, Maryland 20832 Phone: (301) 921-5546
Region III	Lewis P. Blanton c/o Office of Emergency Planning P. O. Box 108 Thomasville, Georgia 31792 Phone: (912) 226-1761
Region IV	Edward Albares c/o Office of Emergency Planning Federal Center Battle Creek, Michigan 49016 Phone: (616) 968-8142
Region V	Albert E. Sweeney, Jr. U.S. Department of Interior Federal Center Denton, Texas 76202 Phone: (817) 387-5811
Region VI	(To be appointed) c/o Office of Emergency Planning Denver Federal Center, Bldg. 50 Denver, Colorado 80225 Phone: (303) 233-3611
Region VII	E. O. Jones c/o Office of Emergency Planning P. O. Box 385 Santa Rosa, California 95403 Phone: (707) 544-1330
Region VIII	Forrest F. Trantham c/o Office of Emergency Planning Everett, Washington 98201 Phone: (206) AL 9-7191

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### 1. National Plans

- a. "The National Plan for Emergency Preparedness," December, 1964. Sets forth the basic principles, policies, responsibilities, preparations and responses of civil government to meet a national emergency and describes the roles of Federal, state and local governments, non-governmental organizations and individual citizens. Chapter 1 covers *Basic Principles*; and Chapter 10 covers *Fuel and Energy*. (Available from the Office of Emergency Planning, Executive Office of the President, Washington, D.C. 20504, or the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington. D.C. 20402—Price: 75 cents.)

### Authority for Priorities and Allocations

- a. "Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended." (50 U.S.C. App. Sec. 2061), (Title I, Sec. 101—Priorities and Allocations). Gives authority to the President to establish priorities and to allocate materials and facilities, as necessary, to promote the national defense.
- b. "Executive Order 10480, as amended." In which the President delegates functions conferred upon him by Title I of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, to the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning and directs him to provide by redelegation or otherwise for their performance by certain Executive Branch officials including the Secretary of the Interior.
- c. "Defense Mobilization Order 8400.1," November 6, 1963. In which the functions of the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning under Title I of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, are delegated to the offices and agencies named in Section 201 of Executive Order 10480, as amended.
- d. "Interior Departmental Manual Release No. 730," March 22, 1965. Delegation of emergency authority to EPGA officials for their use in the event of a declared civil defense emergency or an attack upon the U.S. (Part 205, Chapter 4 of Departmental Manual—205 DM 4.6.)

### 3. Emergency Preparedness Functions

- a. "Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, as amended." In which the President is given all authority formerly vested by law in the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Administration, along with the power to redelegate.
  - b. "Executive Order 10997," February 16, 1962. In which the President assigned emergency preparedness functions to the Secretary of the Interior, including the preparation of national emergency plans and development of preparedness programs covering petroleum and gas and certain other commodities.
  - c. "Interior Departmental Manual Release No. 747," July 7, 1965. Establishment of EPGA on a stand-by basis to discharge promptly the defense responsibilities of the Secretary of the Interior in a national emergency and to assist the Department of the Interior in pre-emergency performance of the emergency preparedness functions relating to petroleum and gas which the President has assigned to the Secretary of the Interior. (Part 190, Chapter 2 of the Departmental Manual (190 DM 2) replaces Part 111, Chapter 12 which was covered by Release No. 730, March 22, 1965 (111 DM 12).)
- ### 4. Priority Use of Resources
- a. "Defense Mobilization Order 8500.1A," November 4, 1964. Provides policy on post-attack use of resources and guidance for priorities on use of resources. (Also lists essential survival items.)
- ### 5. Designation of Federal Claimant Agencies
- a. "Office of Emergency Planning Circular 8500.4A," May 1, 1965. Designation of Federal claimant agencies for emergency preparedness planning.
- ### 6. Example State Plans for Petroleum and Gas
- a. Example State Plan for Petroleum.  
Example of a State Plan for Emergency Management of

- Resources," Part B, Resource Sections, IX. Petroleum. (OEP, May, 1964)
- b. Example State Plan for Gas.  
"Example of a State Plan for Emergency Management of Resources," Part B, Resource Sections, V. Gas. (OEP, May, 1964)

#### 7. National Defense Executive Reserve

- a. "Executive Order 11179," September 22, 1964.  
Provides for the National Defense Executive Reserve authorized by Section 710(e) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended. Supersedes Executive Order 10660, February 15, 1956.
- b. "Defense Mobilization Order 9700.1," February 4, 1965.  
Prescribes the basic objectives, authorities, organization, and administration for the National Defense Executive Reserve.
- c. "OEP Circular 9700.2," February 4, 1965.  
Provides for the selection of candidates for membership in the National Defense Executive Reserve.

#### 8. Authority for Civil Defense

- a. "Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended." (50 U.S.C. App. Sec. 2081.) (Reprinted in "Civil Defense 1965," MP-30, April, 1965, which is available from the Office of Civil Defense, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310.)
- b. "Executive Order 10346, as amended."  
Preparation by Federal agencies of civil defense emergency plans.

#### 9. Reports of the Emergency Advisory Committee for Natural Gas

- a. "Emergency Operations Manual for the Natural Gas Transmission Industry," March, 1965. (Available from the Office of Oil and Gas, Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C. 20240.)

#### 10. Miscellaneous

- a. "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons," Revised Edition, Samuel Glasstone, Editor. (730 Pages, \$3.00, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.)
- b. "Nuclear Attack and Industrial Survival," McGraw-Hill Publishing Company. (Reprint available from Office of Civil Defense, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310.)
- c. "Civil Defense 1965." MP-30, April, 1965. (Available from Office of Civil Defense, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310.)
- d. "Motor Transport Emergency Preparedness." Program for the protection and restoration of motor transport facilities, continuity of motor carriers management, and driver instruction in a national emergency. Issued 1963 by ICC and the Motor Transport Industry (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20401.)
- e. "A Plan for the Operation of the United States National Shipping Authority Organization in Foreign Areas Under Wartime or National Emergency Conditions." February, 1962. (U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, U.S. National Shipping Authority.)



## A Checklist of Procedures in Preparing for Civil Defense in Industry

### Establishing the Company Civil Defense Program

1. Get in touch with your local civil defense director.
2. Appoint corporate and plant civil defense coordinators.
3. Select corporate and plant civil defense advisory committees.
4. Issue corporate policy directives establishing the civil defense program.
5. Train civil defense coordinators and committee members at OGD schools.
6. Join with neighboring plants in organizing industrial mutual aid associations.
7. Prepare a manual of company and plant civil defense plans.
8. Tell stockholders about your company civil defense plan.
9. Let the public know that your company has prepared for civil defense.

### Continuity of Management

0. Establish a control center and emergency communications system.
1. Establish executive succession list.
2. Amend corporate by-laws and regulations as necessary.
3. Establish emergency corporate headquarters at alternate locations.

### Protection of Employees

4. Arrange for receipt and dissemination of warning.
5. Provide fallout shelter for employees and the public.
6. Plan for mass movement of employees to shelter.
7. Enlarge existing protective groups.
8. Organize employees into special groups for self-help.
9. Enroll these groups into departments of local government.
10. Train for—shelter management—radiological monitoring—first aid and medical self-help—decontamination—rescue—fire fighting.
11. Tell employees about the company civil defense plan.

22. Inform and educate employees in methods of personal and home survival.
23. Publish stories about civil defense in company and employee publications.
24. Urge discussion of civil defense at employee meetings.

### Safeguarding of Plant and Property

25. Assess vulnerability of plant and headquarters location.
26. Develop emergency shutdown procedures.
27. Establish a security system for protection against espionage and sabotage.
28. Prepare to detect and report unexploded ordnance and unconventional weapons.
29. Protect vital company records and documents.
30. Deconcentrate production of critical items.
31. Disperse new industrial plants.

### Emergency Organizational Capability

32. Plan for continuity of each important company function.
33. Assign emergency duties to department heads and appropriate employees.
34. Develop emergency financial procedures.
35. Designate post-attack assembly points for employees.
36. Prepare quickly to assess and report damage following attack.
37. Plan for emergency repair and restoration.
38. Develop plans for quickly training employees following attack.
39. Test the disaster control plan with drills and exercises.
40. Provide leadership, support and assistance to local government in preparing for community survival.

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Department of the Interior  
and as a

service to the oil and gas industries and  
all others who may find  
this booklet helpful in their  
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